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Post-Communist Russia’s place in the international system has constituted a 
matter of intense academic interest since the end of the Cold War. In 2006, 
the relationship between the West and Russia cooled markedly in response to 
changing political alliances among the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union and Russia’s alleged use of its oil and gas resources for political 
purposes. Richard Pipes has warned that the West should not trust Russia 
because both its political elites and public opinion are hostile to Western 
values. This paper will argue that public opinion in Russia has been, and 
remains, mostly favourable towards the United States, Europe and the liberal 
democratic political system associated with the ‘West’ and that anti-
Americanism, a discourse considered to be widespread in Europe, remains 
relatively weak in Russia. While many Russian politicians and ideologues 
have urged Russians to view the West as both foreign and hostile, a majority 
of the general public has steadfastly resisted. Sympathetic to Europe and 
unenthusiastic about new wars, Russia’s general public has proved a 
surprisingly resilient ally both for a pragmatic Russian foreign policy and for 
the West.  
 
In the late 1990s, Russia appeared increasingly irrelevant in international terms. 
Shrinking economic output, low oil prices, an ailing president, and declining influence 
over neighbouring states conveyed the impression that Russia was a fading force in world 
affairs (White 2002, 183). In 2006, the picture is very different and Russia’s international 
importance appears stronger than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the current favourable conjuncture of economic growth, high oil prices, 
an energetic president, and the success of Russia in forging partnerships in Asia and 
Europe has revived fears that Russia is ‘leaving the West’ and that it might even rehearse 
the role of a despotic empire that is a threat to its neighbours and world peace (Trenin 
2006, Edwards 2006). Fresh warnings that a revitalised Russian imperialism was on the 
march came in early 2006 at a regional summit of East European leaders. At that 
meeting, United States Vice-President Dick Cheney criticised Russia for using its energy 
resources to blackmail its neighbours, while Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili 
accused political forces in Moscow of ‘imperial nostalgia’ (BBC 2006). The most recent 
American Council on Foreign Relations report on Russia (Edwards 2006) has described 
Russia as undergoing ‘de-democratisation’; this report concluded that, alone among the 
European countries, Russia was moving away from democratic norms.  
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 Two widely divergent discourses are now commonplace in academic and popular 
commentary about Russia: one suggests that Russia is in transition to democracy and has 
adopted a pragmatic and ‘pro-Western’ orientation in its foreign policy; the second 
suggests that Russia is at a crossroads, a phony democracy likely to fall prey to 
authoritarianism and to seek to ally itself with like-minded, non-democratic regimes in 
order to balance the West. Criticism of Russia’s progress towards democracy is usually 
directed at elite decision makers in Russia. At the same time, such criticism is likely to 
reinvigorate an equally pessimistic discourse about Russian public opinion. Pessimistic 
assessments about Russian voting behaviour first emerged in the early 1990s when, 
following a brief flirtation with the democrats of the early post-Communist era, it was 
noted that Russian voters preferred politicians described as nationalists, conservatives, 
and so-called ‘state-builders’ at the expense of pro-Western liberal reformers. Some 
commentators feared that Russia might follow the example of the Weimar republic, the 
post-World War-One democracy whose failure prepared the way for Hitler and the Nazis 
(Brubaker 1996, 140). Such fears did not recede even after Russia’s support for the 
American-led ‘war on terror’ after 11 September 2001. Yegor Gaidar, the liberal Prime 
Minister in the first Yeltsin government, was one of many commentators who evoked the 
spectre of Weimar when he described the parliamentary elections of 2003 as a disaster 
that had created ‘a radical nationalistic wave with consequences difficult to predict’ 
(Kumpilova 2004).  
 Before the mid 1980s, Russian public opinion was a mystery to Western 
researchers, who suffered from an almost total lack of information aside from the 
testimony of émigrés. Since the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the 
reverse is true; those interested in tracking and interpreting Russian public opinion are 
spoilt and sometimes overwhelmed by the remarkable amount of information available. 
Alongside the monitoring of the attitudes of ordinary Russians by international as well as 
Russian research institutes, there is also close scrutiny of the statements of government 
officials, as well as substantial commentary upon the written and spoken words of 
nationalist agitators, political advocates and intellectuals. The problem now is not the 
absence of data concerning Russian public opinion, but how this data should be 
interpreted. While Zimmerman (2002) has provided a comprehensive account of the 
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evolution of Russian public opinion during the 1990s, analysis of the Russian public’s 
view of international affairs remains a work-in-progress. 
This paper takes as its starting point one of the most pessimistic accounts of Russia 
put forward in recent years. In 2004, Richard Pipes (2004) argued the case that Russia 
represented a real danger to the West because Russian elites and public opinion shared 
the same authoritarian, anti-Western and imperial values. Pipes cited polls that suggested 
that only 10% of Russians would actively resist a communist coup and that most 
Russians desired the reconstitution of the Soviet Union (2004, 15). According to Pipes, 
‘Many Russians still see themselves as surrounded by foes and that, in descending order, 
the threats are: "industrial-financial circles in the West," the United States, NATO, 
Russian "oligarchs" and bankers, democrats, and Islamic extremists’ (2004, 14). 
Russians, it seems, viewed force as the preferred option when dealing with foreigners; 
when asked how they would like their country to be perceived by other nations, 48% of 
Russians said ‘mighty, unbeatable, indestructible, a great world power’, while only 3% 
wanted to be perceived as ‘peace-loving and friendly (2004, 14). According to Pipes, 
Russians were still fighting the Cold War; 78% of Russians insisted that Russia must be a 
‘great power’ (2004, 14). When asked ‘Do you feel European’ only 12% responded ‘yes, 
always’, while 56% replied, ‘Practically never’ (2004, 15). According to Pipes (2004, 
13):  
having lost its sense of national identity after 1991, Russia is struggling to create a 
new one based on a blend of tsarism, Communism and Stalinism. People’s 
identification with strong government  - at home and abroad – is a central part of 
this effort. And a strong government means military prowess that foreigners will 
respect or just fear’.  
 
For Pipes, it was not just a matter of opinion polls. He complained that political scientists 
often lacked a sense of history and implied that the depressing record of the tsars and the 
Soviet system needed to be considered in any discussion of present-day Russia.  
 Pipes is certainly right to urge that current assessments of Russia should be 
subjected to the reality check of the historical record. However, his conclusions about 
Russian popular opinion are not well supported by the evidence of opinion polls or 
history. The case put in this paper is that, when placed in a comparative perspective, 
Russian public opinion is best viewed as fitting within a broader European pattern of 
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opinion about the United States, that Russians are disinclined to view force as an 
acceptable tool of foreign policy, and that the Russian public’s reluctance to vote for 
nationalist political parties hostile to the West is in keeping with the broader pattern of 
Russian history.  
 In making his case, Pipes cited fourteen opinion polls published in Izvestiia, a 
newspaper that for the most part has a reputation for being liberal and pro-Western. As 
Pipes has pointed out, much of the polling can be traced back to three reputable 
organizations, and principally to the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 
directed by Iurii Levada (2004, 10). The Levada Center has conducted literally hundreds 
of polls and these can be compared to the research into the opinions of the Russian public 
carried out by Western research organisations and their Russian collaborators. The case 
to be made here is that the methodology employed by Pipes, that is, citing opinion polls 
and the historical record, can be employed just as easily to show that a majority of 
Russian public opinion does not conform to the gloomy picture that he has painted.  
 Pipes (2004, 11) asserted that Russians do not trust their state, are asocial and 
apolitical, imagine that they live in trenches surrounded by enemies and regard 
democracy as a fraud. This is worrying because the case is often made that democracies 
are less likely to resort to war to achieve foreign-policy objectives. It is certainly true that 
surveys suggest that there was much less enthusiasm for democracy in 2005 than there 
was in the early 1990s. The 1991 Pulse of Europe survey found that 51% of Russians 
trusted democratic government to solve the country's problems while only 39% indicated 
a preference for relying upon a strong leader. In 2005, 28% of Russians expressed 
confidence in democratic government; 81% of Russians expressed the view that a strong 
economy was preferable to democracy (Pew 2005).  
 Here it is worth making the point that it would seem likely that the term 
‘democracy’ is more discredited than the concept itself. The most recent Council on 
Foreign Relations report on Russia (Edwards 2006) noted that there were good reasons 
for distinguishing between the authoritarian tendencies of elite decision makers and the 
seemingly democratic instincts of the ordinary public. The report noted that:  
Although the Russian public is often described as uninterested in politics and 
deferential to authority, poll results show attitudes much like those of other 
European countries. The respected Levada Center has found that 66 percent of 
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Russians feel the country needs an effective political opposition and 60 percent 
believe the media should be one of the forces playing such a role. 
 
As will become clear from what follows, there are good reasons for thinking that 
Russians resemble Europeans not just in their attitudes towards democracy, but also in 
their attitudes towards international issues. Thus, the attack upon the United States in 
September 2001 prompted not just offers of cooperation from the Russian elite, but 
strong support for such a policy from the public. O’Loughlin (2002, 19)) noted that there 
were few risks for Putin when he chose to bandwagon with the United States after 11 
September 2001 given that three quarters of Russians polled supported the concept of an 
alliance between Russia and the United States to fight international terrorism. According 
to O’Loughlin (2002, 5), Russians distinguish between two geopolitical scripts, the first 
articulating a ‘fear of an American diktat in Russian domestic affairs’ and the second 
articulating an admiration of ‘Western economic, technological and social achievements’.  
Those who have seen a danger from the right in Russia have had no difficulty in 
uncovering potential nationalist threats to Russia’s democracy. In the early 1990s, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Red-Brown alliance between Communists and nationalists, 
and President Yeltsin himself, who forcibly closed down the Russian parliament in 1993, 
all appeared to represent a threat to the democracy promised in 1991 (Service, 1998). 
From the mid 1990s, the anti-Western element in Russian politics coalesced into what is 
often labeled the Eurasianist movement, a generic term for those in Russia who see the 
West as an enemy. The original Eurasianists of the early twentieth century comprised 
intellectuals who saw their mission as rediscovering ‘a distinct civilizational space for 
Russia’. Eurasianist ideologues have traditionally emphasized the Asian heritage of 
Russia and the common culture that links Slavs and Turks; they extol the achievements of 
the Mongols as a unifying force and as an inspiration for an eastern alliance against the 
West; they argue that Orthodoxy is an Eastern religion and see the West as a source of 
rivalry and exploitation (Laruelle, 2004, 116). In the 1990s, Yevgenii Primakov, Yeltsin’s 
prime minister and foreign minister, advocated policies that were often described as 
Eurasianist (Lynch, 2001, 9). In 2001, Communist Party leader Zyuganov reaffirmed that, 
in the view of his party, Russia was a ‘Eurasianist’ country.  
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Arguably, the most noteworthy feature of Eurasianist politics has been its singular 
failure to capture the imagination of Russian voters. Radical nationalism was not a 
significant force in Russian elections in the 1990s even though the state became steadily 
more authoritarian (Tuminez 2000, 16). Nor did Eurasianism inspire homeland 
nationalism among the Russians allegedly marooned in the ‘near abroad’, that is, Russia’s 
new post-Soviet neighbours. For all the fears of conflict resulting from the fact that 
twenty-five million Russians now lived outside of Russia, there was a striking absence of 
nationalism in the Russian diaspora, no fifth columns in Kazakhstan or Ukraine, and little 
ethnic mobilisation of Russians in Tatarstan or the Caucasus (Lieven 1999, 67). The only 
exception was Moldova where the Trans-Dnestr region carved out a de-facto independent 
existence with the support of Russia, although this seems to have been a case of Russia 
supporting a local initiative (Lynch 2001, 12). As for a geopolitical reorientation of 
Russia away from Europe towards the Turkic world, this remains a matter of speculation 
and fantasy. As Lieven has put it, the Slav-Turk union urged by the Eurasianists seems 
particularly unlikely given the ‘traditional Russian contempt and hatred for the Turks’ as 
the successor state to the Ottomans (Lieven 1999, 68).
A number of polls taken in the fifteen years since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
have indicated that as many as three quarters of Russians were nostalgic for the Soviet 
Union as a great and powerful country. This evidence should be viewed in context (White 
2002, 192). There is overwhelming evidence that the Russian public add the qualifier that 
they do not want territorial realignments if that would involve a war. It is easy to find 
appeals to Russian nationalism in Russian history over the last century and a half that 
point to the possibility of expansionist tendencies. Pan-Slavism emphasised Russia’s duty 
to support the Serbs and other embattled Slav peoples in eastern and central Europe, and 
was a potential source of war against the Ottomans. One hundred years later, in 1999, 
there were calls for Russians to support the Serbs in their conflict with NATO. Yet 
Russians have not responded with any enthusiasm to such calls. The most striking recent 
evidence of Russian indifference to Pan-Slavism came in 1999 when NATO bombed 
Serbian territory in the dispute over Kosovo between March and June 1999. In a poll of 
nearly two thousand people taken in January 2000, Levada asked Russians whom they 
sympathized with in ‘a conflict in Serbia between Serbs and ethnic Albanians living in 
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Kosovo’? As Table One shows, Levada found that, less than a year after NATO’s 
bombing of Serbia, more than three-quarters of the Russians polled responded that they 
had ‘no sympathy for either’ or were ‘not interested at all’. 
 
Table One 
Levada Poll taken in January 2000 




No sympathy for either 42 
Not at all interested 36 
Source: Levada poll carried out Jan 19-29, 2000. URL< http://www.russiavotes.org/>  
Section V: International Security, Russia’s Place in the World, Table Three. Consulted 03/07/2006. 
 
 
Russians have tended not to view violence as a preferred option even when their 
co-nationals are under threat in the ‘near abroad’. As Table Two shows, the same Levada 
poll taken in January 2000 found that, in the event of their co-nationals in the former 
Soviet space coming under threat, Russians, by a majority of four-to-one, favoured 
negotiation over military action. 
Table Two 
Levada Poll taken in January 2000 
‘Q. If Russians in the near abroad were under threat from the government there, the 
Russian government could respond in different ways. Which of the following actions 
would you support?’ 
Negotiate 94% 
Use Economic Pressure 64% 
Resettle People of Russian nationality in 
the Russian Federation 
72% 
Military Action 20% 
A Policy of Non-Interference in the affairs 
of other countries 
36% 
Source: Levada poll carried out Jan 19-29, 2000. URL< http://www.russiavotes.org/>  




Like other European publics, Russians claim that they are critics of American 
foreign policy, and not hostile to the American public. As the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project (2005) has found, Russians believe that they are able to discern positive and 
negative features among Americans: 
 
61% of Russians have a positive impression of Americans.  Majorities in Russia 
associate Americans with the positive characteristics “hard-working”  (72%), and 
“inventive” (56%); yet just 32% say the term “honest” applies to Americans.  
Majorities of Russians also describe Americans as “greedy” (60%) and “violent” 
(54%), and a relatively large minority calls Americans “immoral” (42%).  
 
Pew (2006) has tracked the phenomenon of ‘anti-Americanism’ over time and across the 
world. Anti-Americanism is a term that is applied to a vast array of attitudes belonging to 
individuals who range from those harboring deep-seated prejudices against American 
‘values and way of life’ to those who are merely critical of aspects of American foreign 
policy (Singh 2006, 29).  There is no space here to answer the question of why Russians 
hold the views that they do; the point to be made is that Russians do not appear to be 
especially ‘anti-American’ when compared to public opinion in Western Europe.  As 
Table Three shows, the opinion of Russians about the United States has tended to follow 
the pattern evident elsewhere in Europe as measured by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. 
 
Table Three 
Pew Global Attitudes Survey 1999-2006 
‘Favourable Opinions of the United States’ 
 
 1999/2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Great 
Britain 
83 75 70 58 55 56 
France 62 63 43 37 43 39 
Germany 78 61 45 38 41 37 
Spain 50  38  38 30 
Russia 37 61 36 47 52 43 
Source: Information compiled from Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2006 ‘America’s Image Slips, But Allies 
share US Concerns over Iran, Hamas. 15-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey’, 
URL<www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/PAG_report_2006.pdf  >. Consulted 03/07/2006 
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 It is true that at the end of the 1990s, the Russian public’s love of the United States 
had reached its nadir. In 1999/2000, only 37% of Russians expressed a ‘favourable 
opinion about the United States’, according to Pew. This polling was conducted in the 
wake of the 1998 financial crisis and after the NATO bombing of Serbia, which was 
opposed by Russia, and when anti-Western rhetoric had received more legitimacy under 
Prime Minister Primakov, known for his criticisms of the United States. This outcome 
can be compared to Pew’s finding that 78% of Germans held a favourable opinion about 
the United States in 1999/2000.  
 Since then, Russian public opinion has followed a trajectory common to much of 
the world. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, Russians expressed their sympathy for 
the United States and tended to support the American-led crusade against Islamic 
extremism (O’Loughlin 2002, 19).  In 2002, favourable opinion about the United States 
in Russia climbed to 61%, the same level as in Germany.  As the invasion of Iraq loomed 
in 2003, favourable opinions about the United States, as measured by the Pew surveys, 
plummeted in Russia and in many other countries. In Russia, favourable opinion about 
the United States in 2003 fell to 36% and in Germany to 45%. Thereafter, Russian 
opinion about the United States has risen much faster than in Germany, France and Spain. 
Favourable opinion of the United States in Russia was 52% in 2005, a figure that almost 
matched that of Britain (55%) and was higher than that recorded in France (41%), 
Germany (43%) and Spain (38%). According to Pew, in 2006 Russia (43%) maintained 
its lead over France (39%), Germany (37%) and Spain (30%).  
 Levada’s polling has produced similar results when asking the question, ‘How on 
the whole do you feel about the United States?’ Russians were required to choose 
between the following five answers: ‘Totally Bad’, ‘Mostly Bad’, ‘Totally Good’, 
‘Mostly Good’, and ‘Don’t Know’. Table Four shows that, according to the polling 
carried out by Levada, the low point for Russian ‘feeling’ about the United States 
coincided with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was the only occasion when the 
combined ‘Mostly Bad’ and ‘Very Bad’ assessment of the United States represented a 
majority of those polled. In every other year, Russian opinion was more positive than 
negative about the United States. As is the case throughout much of the world, it does not 
seem to be American values that alienated Russian public opinion. Rather, perception of 
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a ‘unilateralist’ American foreign policy appears to be the issue for Russians, as well as 
for many others around the globe. 
Table Four 
Levada Polls 2001-06 
‘Q. how on the whole do you feel about the United States?’ 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 March 
05 
Oct 05 Dec 05 06 
Very 
Good 
6 4 3 5 6 4 3 3 
Mostly 
Good 
53 55 35 48 59 57 54 50 
Total 
Good 
59 59 38 53 65 61 57 53 
Mostly 
Bad 
21 26 37 26 22 22 25 30 
Very 
Bad 
7 7 18 10 6 8 7 9 
Total 
Bad 
28 33 55 36 28 30 32 39 
Don’t 
Know 
13 8 7 11 7 9 11 8 
Source: Levada Center surveys, 1999-2006. Section V: International Security, ‘USA and NATO’, Question 
1. URL< http://www.russiavotes.org/> Consulted 03/07/2006. 
 
Pipes (2004, 15) has suggested that Russians see themselves as situated outside of 
European civilisation; opinion polls, he noted, showed that only 13% of respondents 
placed Russia as part of ‘European and Western civilisation’. Other commentators have 
discovered, sometimes to their surprise, that Russians are much more favourably inclined 
towards ‘Europe’. The survey commissioned by White, Mc Allister, Light and 
Lowenhardt asked the general public of four post-Soviet states (Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Belarus): ‘Do you think of yourself as a European?’ (White et. al. 2002, 
189).
The researchers expressed surprise that, as Table Five shows, 52% of Russians 
sometimes or often thought of themselves as European, a figure higher than in Ukraine, 
and noted that: 
Oddly, perhaps, Russians were the most likely to think of themselves ‘often’ and 
‘sometimes’ as Europeans, although a quarter of the population lived, 
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geographically speaking, in Asia; and they were least likely of all four groups to 
have difficulty answering the question. 
 
Table Five 
White, McAllister, Light and Lowenhardt 
‘Do you think of yourself as a European?’ 
 Belarus Moldova Russia Ukraine 
Often 16 9 18 8 
Sometimes 34 25 34 26 
Rarely/Never 38 56 47 57 
Don’t Know 12 10 2 8 
Source: White, S, I McAllister, M Light and J Lowenhardt. 2002. ‘A European or a Slavic Choice? Foreign 
Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe’, Europe-Asia Studies 54(2): 181-202. 
 
In 2000, Levada asked Russians whether they ‘feel European’ and achieved similar 
results to those reported by White et al., as Table Six demonstrates.  
Table Six 
Levada Poll taken in 2000 
‘Q. Do you consider yourself European?’ 
Not at all 19 
Probably Not 29 
Probably Yes 35 
Definitely Yes 18 
Source: Levada poll carried out Jan 19-29, 2000. URL< http://www.russiavotes.org/>  
Section V: International Security, Russia’s Place in the World, Table Four. Consulted 03/07/2006. 
 
According to Levada, 53% of Russians answered ‘Probably Yes’ (35%) or ‘Definitely 
Yes’ (18%) to this question. While nearly half the sample responded negatively, that is, 
‘Not at all’ (19%) and ‘Probably Not’ (29%), there seems little reason for claiming, as 
Pipes does, that a majority of Russians view themselves as outside of ‘Europe’ or 
Western Civilisation.  
This European orientation of Russians confirms the wider pattern identified by the 
surveys undertaken by Kolossov, who, on the basis of surveys conducted in 2000 and 
2001, concluded that ‘Russian public opinion may be more willing to support cooperation 
with the West than many people might think’ (Kolossov 2003 121). According to 
Kolossov, ‘there are no general anti-Western feelings in Russian society’. In March 2001, 
83% of respondents declared that they were in favour of improved relations between 
Russia and the European Union and the United States. At the peak of the crisis in Kosovo 
in 1999, 59% of respondents, including half of those who voted for the Communists, 
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declared that they supported an improvement in relations with the United States. Only 
14% of respondents thought that Russia should join a coalition against the United States 
(Kolossov 2003, 141). 
 Finally, the point that needs to be made is that the relative weakness of 
nationalism in post-Communist Russia is consistent with longer-term trends in Russian 
history. Scholars of nationalism have noted that nationalism, in its classic western 
European form at least, is very weak in Russia. There was little civil society or nationalist 
propaganda under the tsarist and Soviet systems; the tsarist policy of ‘official nationality’ 
was state driven and top-down, while the Soviet government attempted to create a ‘new 
Soviet person’ as a replacement for particularist and nationalistic sentiment.  
 As Lieven has put it, Russian identity was subsumed for most of the modern era in 
a broader imperial, religious or ideological identity (Lieven 1999, 55-56). Tolz (2001, 70-
73) has pointed out that for Russia, the process of nation building has been complicated 
in that: 
the early creation of an empire  (well before the process of Russian nation building 
began), the empire's land-based character and the resulting high level of mutual 
cultural influences and assimilation between conquerors and conquered to some 
extent blurred the feeling of difference between the imperial people and other 
subjects of the empire. 
 
For Rowley (2000, 24), if Gellner’s definition of nationalism as a political principle 
demanding that ‘the political and the national unit should be congruent’ is accepted, 
Russia is conspicuous for its failure to develop nationalist movements. Captured by an 
imperial discourse, Russian political movements –Slavophiles, Westerners, Pan-Slavs 
and Eurasianists- developed a ‘conceptual universe that had more in common with the 
universal, absolutist religious categories of medieval Christendom than with the 
particularist, relative and secular categories of modern Europe’. Even the term 
‘nationalism’ is a pejorative one in Russia, associated with minority separatism such as 
the independence struggle of the Chechen rebels.  
The absence of nationalism was an outcome deliberately engineered by tsarist and 
Soviet authorities.  The two regimes did not have much ideology in common; an aversion 
to nationalism was one area of agreement (Suny 1993, 23). Soviet leaders built a 
multiethnic state as an antidote to nationalism, especially Russian nationalism.  By 
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encouraging minority culture - local languages, publications, schools, museums and 
promotion of minority nationality leaders - the Soviet Union followed a conscious policy 
of affirmative action (Martin 2001, 82). But it never allowed this to develop into political 
activity on the part of nationalists, whether Russian or non-Russian. While from the late 
1930s, Russian language and culture were celebrated under Stalin, Russian nationalism 
was subordinated to the cause of the Soviet state.  
 Nationalism, both Russian and non-Russian, was present at the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, but historians have mostly taken the view that it was a response to the 
Soviet collapse rather than a cause. Suny (1993) has argued that the Soviet Union 
collapsed because national elites, often with shallow roots among ordinary citizens, took 
advantage of the Gorbachev-inspired crisis at the centre of the Soviet system. It is likely 
that Russian democracy has suffered precisely from the retarded development of 
nationalism in Russia. As Gill has put it, Russia lacked the ‘vigorous nationalist 
movement to provide an umbrella under which other sorts of civil society forces could 
develop’ (Gill 2006, 74). 
Brubaker (1996, 140), among others, has emphasized that the end of empire 
presents opportunities as well as difficulties. Germany in 1918 was well placed to take 
advantage of the Versailles Treaty in geopolitical terms. To the east lay mostly new and 
relatively weak states and a pariah in Soviet Russia. It was reasonable to expect that 
Germany would have evolved into the political and economic centre of Europe. Hitler 
and the Nazis squandered this opportunity by resorting to an excessively aggressive 
foreign policy. Russia too might reasonably expect to be an important political and 
economic centre for the post-Soviet space. Russian diplomacy is aimed at establishing a 
multi-polar world while reestablishing Russia’s political and economic influence within 
the former Soviet space.  
As Brubaker (1996, 140) pointed out in the mid 1990s, an important difference 
between post-Communist Russia and Weimar Germany is that Weimar politicians were 
intent on changing the borders imposed by Versailles while Russian politicians have 
treated the matter of borders with much less urgency:  
There is a rough elite consensus on the need to restore Russia’s status as a world or 
at least continental power; but there is no consensus that this necessarily requires 
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border adjustments, let alone the wholesale reincorporation of newly independent 
states.  
This prediction that there would be little pressure for a redrawing of borders from within 
Russia has proved correct. For Brubaker, this came about because territory mattered less 
to contemporary politicians living in a world that prizes economic hegemony than it did 
to inter-war states in Europe. At the same time, it should be added that there is no 
pressure from Russian public opinion to reverse the post-Communist settlement of 1991; 
quite the reverse is true given the clear opposition of public opinion to wars over 
territory. 
 The case being put forward here is not that Russians are overwhelmingly enamored 
of the United States. Polls consistently show that Russians are fearful of and opposed to 
NATO expansion and specific American actions such as the invasion of Iraq. There are 
indeed substantial numbers of Russians who are hostile not just to American foreign 
policy but to the ‘West’ in general. On the other hand, historically, Russia has not been a 
hotbed of nationalism; Slavophiles and Eurasianists have found it hard to mobilize 
support in the general public and have never done well in elections. Overall, opinion polls 
confirm that a majority of Russians look at the world pragmatically and have attitudes 
that appear to lie within the mainstream of European opinion.  
Russian public opinion matters to this debate not because the Russian public is 
especially knowledgeable about foreign affairs or because it has a direct impact upon the 
elites, which, in Russia and elsewhere, jealously guard their privileges in formulating 
foreign policy. President Putin has proved enormously popular and won more than two-
thirds of the vote at the presidential elections of 2004. Yet, until recently at least, Putin’s 
foreign policy projected a patriotic, but pragmatic image, and his administration, for the 
most part, acted accordingly (O’Loughlin 2004, 19). In many ways, this pragmatism was 
a continuation of the foreign policy practiced under President Yeltsin by Foreign 
Ministers Kozyrev and Primakov (Lynch 2001. 24-26). Of course, many factors are likely 
to be at work in shaping a pragmatic foreign policy, such the relative weakness of Russia 
and the diplomatic professionalism of the foreign-policy elite. Nonetheless, it seems clear 
that such a pragmatic foreign policy has at the very least been facilitated by the 
pragmatism of Russian public opinion. Given the major divisions that quickly emerged 
within Russia’s foreign policy-making elite (McFaul 1999) it is, at the very least, 
 15
plausible that Russian public opinion acts a restraint upon the elites in preventing the 
emergence of a more aggressive foreign policy (Kolossov 2003, 121). While relations 
between Russia and the West underwent considerable strain in early 2006, there seems 
little reason to fear the realisation of Pipes’ nightmarish scenario of Russian elites and 
public opinion acting in concert to oppose the ‘West’.  Russian public opinion has, on the 
contrary, proved a resilient and valuable ally of the West in the era of the ‘war on terror’.  
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